Deepening Stabilization in Libya: Overcoming Challenges to Young Women's Participation in Peace Building

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INTRODUCTION

As Libya struggles with continued political conflict and economic turmoil amid the COVID-19 pandemic, young women who want to contribute to peacebuilding, political processes, and economic reconstruction face serious obstacles. Their marginalization inhibits prospects for a sustainable peace and reconstruction, as political settlements that fail to include all age and gender demographics tend to perform worse over the medium and long run.[1] This paper summarizes some of the challenges young Libyan women face and offers recommendations for international, national, and local stakeholders. The challenges and recommendations outlined here are drawn directly from a series of conferences held with and by young Libyan women, and were developed through further research and consultation. (see Annex A).

The fact that young women's participation in Libyan peace building processes face impediments should be not construed to deny the important, multifaceted roles young women already play. On the contrary, this fact underscores the need to empower those women. Across Libya, and in spite of serious and sometimes deadly challenges, young women are increasingly participating in politics through voting, civil society activism, and holding high-level ministerial positions. They operate on the front lines of countering violent extremism, not only in their traditional capacities as family members but as also community gatekeepers, service providers, and conflict mediators. Young women, no less than men, seek opportunities to improve their lives through education and employment, although the challenges they face are often starkly gendered. This paper's enumeration of the impediments young women face in Libya casts them not as victims but as actors who face unique challenges that require tailored responses.

The foremost challenge for young Libyan women is the persistent lack of security and threat of violence. Sexual and gender-based violence, compounded by the gendered impacts of conflict, internal displacement, reliance on informal justice mechanisms, and restrictions on mobility, deprive young women of opportunities to make their voices heard. Additionally, they lack meaningful political representation – and too often, when young Libyan women enter politics, they face further violence and social backlash. Discriminatory laws and social norms that impede women's rights are mutually reinforcing. Due to unequal access to training, capital, and social support, Libyan women are regularly locked out of higher-income private sector jobs, and are often shoehorned into traditional public sector or retail occupations. Although there are many inspiring exceptions, young Libyan women are too frequently excluded from engagement in Libya's civic and economic life as a result of these interrelated challenges.

The UN and the international community should ensure full participation of and support for young women in all political, social, and economic programs, and should offer specialized support for internally displaced women and entrepreneurs who face unique challenges. Libyan policymakers should integrate women into the security, legislative, executive, and judicial government apparatus at all levels and should provide specialized services to women. Libyan civil society should highlight women's success stories, train women in business and political skills, support the establishment of a social protection framework, counter patriarchal narratives, and pressure policymakers to

implement changes. Finally, researchers should provide gender- and age-disaggregated data about violence, economic inequality, access to social and basic services including health and education, and other issues facing young Libyan women.

SITUATION AND CHALLENGES

Lack of physical security and legal protection for victims of violence

The participation of young women in Libyan political and economic processes faces an especially pernicious challenge from the real and perceived threat of violence. Libya's great diversity means that women's experiences across the country are highly variable. However, much of the violence falls into identifiable patterns. Women who participate in politics face a higher risk of violence, including abduction and assassination, and are increasingly at risk of
gender-based violence (GBV).[2] While there are laws in place to protect women, they often face discrimination, disbelief, and harassment when reporting crimes, and enforcement is inconsistent at best.[3]

The forms of violence experienced by Libyan women are myriad, including robbery, assault, domestic violence, and more. Women represent 51% of Libyan internally displaced persons (IDPs) and face a higher risk in shelters and IDP camps due to a lack of privacy, safe places, effective security, and freedom from harassment.[4,5] Sexual assault, an especially damaging form of violence due to its effects on the victim's psychology and social reputation, has been used by combatants in Libya's ongoing conflict.[6] Each of these forms of violence creates an impediment, deterring and punishing

women who engage in public institutions and processes.

Women who come forward and report instances of violence face other challenges. Domestic and sexual violence are taboo topics in Libya, and a female victim who reports a sexual crime is more likely to be accused of tarnishing her family's honor and punished for "extramarital sex" than see the perpetrator brought to justice.[7,8] Official security bodies, such as the police, are characterized by a lack of sensitivity and awareness when dealing with violence against women, a problem exacerbated by very low female participation in such organizations.[9,10] As a result, Libyan women are twice as likely as men to rely on informal justice mechanisms to resolve violent crimes.[11]

Compounding the challenges of GBV and inadequate justice mechanisms, there are few support networks for women victims of violence in Libya, especially those in rural areas or with less education. In fact, in many parts of Libya, women-only spaces of any kind are frowned upon as nontraditional.[12] Additionally, the Libyan penal code provides a mechanism to exonerate perpetrators of rape if they marry the victim (see Annex B). The absence of support for specialized survivor-led organizations perpetuates the alienation of GBV survivors in society at large. Similarly, the lack of gender-disaggregated data on conflict casualties and GBV works to erase the gendered impact of conflict on women.

The security situation, compounded by social and political factors, severely limits Libyan women's freedom of movement, which in turn inhibits their ability to fully participate in Libya's civic and economic life. Freedom of movement is essential to an individual's ability to pursue livelihood

opportunities, from education to jobs. In Libya, there is a stark divide between the freedom to move experienced by women and men. According to UN Women polling, Libyan women are four times more likely to have never left their homes alone, four times more likely to have never travelled between cities and neighborhoods alone, and three times more likely to have never traveled outside of Libya alone, compared with Libyan men.[13] While few localities in Libya have official rules curtailing women's mobility, the social norm dictating that women must travel with a male chaperone is still strong, especially in more rural communities and among less educated populations.[14] As a result, the women who are already marginalized and excluded face higher barriers to accessing resources like training workshops, higher education, and urban job prospects. It is also harder for women to participate in other aspects of civic life, like community meetings that are scheduled late at night or in places where it is difficult for women to attend.[15]

Lack of political representation

The lack of attention paid to young women's concerns in Libya is likely due in large part to the lack of political representation for women at all levels of government. Thanks to Libya's Law 59, each municipal council must have at least one-woman councilor – although not all municipal councils have elected or appointed one – but this is far from sufficient. Additionally, young women experience even greater difficulty participating in politics. Overall, women comprise only 12% of local councilors, and the figures are similarly stark for executive positions, local security bodies, and religious leaders.[16] While Libyan women vote at similar rates to men, women are about half as likely as men to say they have ever participated in a public meeting.[17]

There are several mutually reinforcing factors contributing to the low level of women's representation and participation in civic bodies. One is the threat of violence against public female figures who threaten male-dominated power structures, such as the high-profile assassinations and abductions of Salwa Bughaighis, Intissar Al Hasaeri, Freeha Al-Berkawi, and Siham Sergewa.[18,19] Second, women who want to engage in politics in Libya must push back against a culture of marginalization in which women's expected roles in society do not extend into political discourse.[20] Third, women who decide to run for office are perceived as being less qualified and experienced than male candidates. This, of course, creates a positive feedback loop wherein women who lack political experience are denied the opportunity to gain it. Finally, Libyan women often do not see clear mechanisms to enter into politics. There are few examples of successful women politicians to emulate and inadequate support structures to identify and promote young women activists.[21]

The lack of women's participation in Libyan political processes is more than just an issue of representation, it is a practical obstruction to meaningful progress. Research has shown that when women participate in conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, they are 64% less likely to fail, 35% more likely to last at least 15 years, and post-conflict economic recovery is enhanced.[22]

Social backlash against highly-visible women

Young Libyan women's participation in peacebuilding, political, and livelihood opportunities are impeded by the intense social backlash which all-too-often meets high-visibility Libyan women.[23] Threats and

harassment are leveled at women who venture beyond traditional gender roles, in person and especially online, where harassers can hide behind fake accounts and anonymity. The social opprobrium leveled at women-run initiatives is often severe enough to deter other women from participating at all.[24]

The harassment faced by young women activists, entrepreneurs, and leaders on social media is especially concerning, as social media is one of the few ways Libyan women can connect safely and share their stories. Libyan activists report that many women are afraid to post online because of the bullying and unwanted attention they receive.[25] However, the increasing reach of social media remains one of the most promising tools for civil society and others to challenge stereotypes about the abilities and potential impact of young women.

Lack of awareness of rights and opportunities

One persistent inhibition to women's greater participation in political and economic life is a lack of awareness of what rights and opportunities are available to Libyan women. Some of these impediments are, of course, entangled with spotty enforcement of extant laws, but others are due to ignorance of existing choices and resources that can be remedied with training programs and awareness initiatives for Libya's young women, especially if government institutions are mandated to substantiate women's rights at all levels.

For example, Libyan labor legislation guarantees women freedom from discrimination, the right to maternity leave, and the right to employment without wage discrimination.[26] Certainly, conservative cultural norms and a lack of enforcement

limit the practical value of these laws, but no one can advocate for the implementation of a law they do not even know exists.[27]

Another major gap exists in the availability of practical information for running a business. Libyan women disproportionately lack knowledge of the technical details of starting a business (especially in the formal economy), marketing and delivering products, negotiating salaries, and learning and following regulations, especially those related to registration and social protection.[28] Girls' education, and the educational pathways into which young women are often pigeonholed, teach few of these skills which are needed for success in the private sector.

In other cases, women-targeted services exist – such as a workshop for women entrepreneurs or a hotline for survivors of GBV – but are not broadly used, whether because of ignorance or fear of social backlash.[29] Indeed, in Libya, where the idea of phone hotlines in general is relatively new, many people are uncomfortable discussing such a sensitive issue over one. Domestic violence is an especially complicated issue; not only is the topic taboo in Libya, but many women do not even recognize it as violence.[30] Knowledge about women's rights, in politics, in business, and at home, is an essential tool to empower Libyan women.

Unequal access to economic opportunities

The persistent economic marginalization of women in Libya both contributes to and is exacerbated by the other challenges young women face. 64% of Libyan women do not hold jobs, and only 20% describe themselves as "fully employed."[31] According to the World Bank, the labor force participation rate among Libyan

women aged 15+ is 28%, compared to 79% among Libyan men.[32] Additionally, over half of employed women work in the stereotypically female sectors of education and health, compared with 7% of employed men.[33] In the private sector, which remains relatively small in Libya as a proportion of total employment, women are underrepresented, and are far less likely to be entrepreneurs or work high-paying jobs in the oil sector.[34]

When Libyan women are able to find jobs in the private sector, they often report facing discrimination in the workplace, ranging from being ignored in meetings or called last to being passed over for promotion in favor of a male coworker. Employed Libyan women are 15% less likely than men to hold managerial-level jobs.[35,36] Additionally, self-employed women face a host of challenges, ranging from a lack of support and encouragement from their families, to insufficient available capital, to harassment and discrimination in the marketplace.[37]

Patriarchy is still largely predominant in Libya, as it is globally. Women are often expected to adhere to certain traditional roles, such as housewife, nurse, or schoolteacher. This is reflected not only in-home life, where girls are less likely to be taught how to drive, for instance, but also in primary schools, where textbooks rarely depict working women in nontraditional occupations.[38]

As a result of these discrepancies, Libyan women are disproportionately excluded from opportunities to improve their livelihoods. Post-conflict economic recovery that perpetuates such inequality is less likely to be stable or durable in the years ahead. Besides the challenges already raised, from security to awareness, Libyan women who want to work must overcome restrictive stereotypes, workplace discrimination, family pressure, and limited freedom of movement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For UN member states, the UN, and the international community:

- **Ensure full active participation and representation of young women in the peace process.** Women have long played key roles in conflict mediation and civil society in Libya and offer unique experiences and perspectives.

- **Ensure that supported programs represent young women's voices and needs and that gender-sensitive economic recovery is prioritized**. Many current programs emphasize capacity building and improving stability at the expense of inclusiveness, while a more holistic approach can achieve both goals. Women's participation should not be treated as an afterthought or aspirational goal, but should be mandated from the start of any supported project.

- **Provide specialized support for women who face unique challenges.** Programs should recognize and adapt to the gendered and age-related dimensions of issues such as IDP safety, civic spaces, access for people with disabilities, and livelihood opportunities. For instance, programs should supplementary language support when necessary, and should provide gender-awareness training for chaperones.

- **Identify and provide support for Libyan programs that expand empowerment for women.**

Technology, such as e-learning tools, has provided means for women who may face violence or mobility restrictions to access otherwise unavailable resources. Programs that target women should be led by women, both as a means of expanding their reach and to provide examples and experience for women leaders.

- **Engage local actors, especially for projects that may challenge social norms.** The key to winning social acceptance for initiatives that seek to expand the roles of women in public life is to work with and through credible, capable, and experienced locals. Programs that are seen as being imposed on Libya by foreigners face a backlash that limits their uptake and effectiveness.

- **Mainstream gender in programs across different fields, including development, humanitarian assistance, governance, and peacebuilding.** Without deliberate, targeted initiatives and outreach, young women may be unable to fully access resources and opportunities due to the factors outlined in this paper.

For Libyan policymakers:

- **Fully incorporate the principle of gender equality into the constitution and all legislation,** including laws regarding GBV, marriage and divorce, nationality, and employment. Even current iterations of the draft constitution fail to use a comprehensive rights-based approach.

- **Include all commitments to international agreements regarding women's rights into domestic lawmaking.** For instance, implement a

survivor-centered approach to conflict related sexual violence and integrate women fully into the security sector in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2467, and provide specialized support services for survivors of GBV

- **Pass and enforce laws ensuring women's representation at all levels of government**. Quotas for women's participation in national and municipal legislatures will be a starting point, but women must also be represented and integrated into executive and judicial bodies

- **Implement policies to provide capital and capacity-building support to women entrepreneurs and job-seekers**. State institutions that support small and medium-sized enterprises and youth must increase support for women. There is no current percentage of such economic development funds intended for women specifically.

- **Ensure the gender-sensitive educational curriculum reflects the full spectrum of possibilities available for both women and men**. Assumptions and stereotypes about women should be rejected, and girls should not be excluded from practical instruction.

- **Coordinate with national and international organizations that have been working on women's empowerment in Libya to learn best practices and to incorporate, scale up, and replicate their programs.** International NGOs and Libyan civil society organizations have built tremendous institutional knowledge in recent years that can increase the uptake and effectiveness of new, government-organized initiatives.

- **Make the legal requirements of civil society organizations more flexible**. The current legal framework impedes the creation and operation of networks and civil society groups, especially for young women and men.

- **Prevent early and child marriage.** These practices prevent young women from continuing their education and can hamper their social and economic emancipation.

- **Provide age appropriate psycho-social counseling and medical services at schools, universities and in health facilities.** Adolescent girls and young women need safe spaces to seek care and support without discrimination.

- **Revise existing gender discriminatory laws such as those contained in article 424 of the penal code in order to effectively protect GBV survivors.** The current statute perpetuates the normalization of GBV in Libyan society.

For Libyan civil society organizations:

- **Highlight young women's success stories in Libyan society, including in non-traditional businesses.** Both traditional and online media should be used, but care must be taken to avoid exposing women to harassment and bullying.

- **Raise awareness of women about their political and economic rights and obligations**. One of the most valuable roles of civil society is to broaden the scope of the possible for people who have been historically marginalized.

- **Improve women's capacities in business skills such as salary negotiation, marketing, and legal duties.** Many young Libyan women have little training or experience in these areas, putting them at a disadvantage, especially in the private sector.

- **Improve awareness on the many roles young women can play in peacebuilding**. In countries around the world, women have worked as mediators, negotiators, community linchpins, and thought leaders. There are innumerable ways they can contribute to peacebuilding, in addition to their traditional roles.

- **Counter patriarchal narratives and exclusionary language publicly and on social media.** The threat of social backlash is one of the greatest deterrents to greater women's participation in Libyan civic life. Changing attitudes and social behaviors will no doubt be difficult and time-consuming, but it is essential to achieving lasting change.

- **Pressure decisionmakers to implement changes.** The role of civil society is not, and cannot, be limited to education and capacity-building programs. One of its most essential functions is to be a citizens' voice in political decision-making, especially on behalf of those who too often are denied a voice through other channels.

- **Multiply entry points for GBV survivors to a multisectoral and multidimensional age-appropriate chain of services through women's and girls' safe spaces, help lines, and specialized services**. Such services should include safety and

security, mental health and psycho-social support, legal aid, emergency shelter, health care, age-appropriate dignity kits and socio-economic empowerment and livelihood programs.

For researchers:

- **Improve collection of gender- and age-disaggregated conflict and violence data.** The current lack of such data contributes to the erasure of the gendered impact of the Libyan conflict.

- **Improve collection of gender- and age-disaggregated data on economic participation and financial well-being.** Most data available today are based on surveys, which, while valuable, show only an incomplete picture of the economic situation of Libyan women.

- **Improve data sharing practices.** Many organizations collect relevant data and conduct research on Libyan women, but these studies are too rarely disseminated among all the stakeholders in the international community.

[1] Emily Burchfield, "How the exclusion of women has cost Libya," Atlantic Council, November 2019.

[2] Ibid.

[3] UNW and UNFPA, Roundtable discussion, August 2020.

[4] Emily Burchfield, "How the exclusion of women has cost Libya," Atlantic Council, November 2019.

[5] IDP & Returnee Report, Round 31 (May-June 2020), https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/DTM_R31_IDPReturneeReport_FINAL_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=9400

[6] Khalifah, A. (2015). " Women in Libya: The Ongoing Armed Conflict, Political Instability and Radicalization Upholding Gendered Peace at a Time of War." http://womeninwar.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Beirut/6/Asma%20Khalifa_Libyan%20Women%20in%20Conflict-UHGPW.pdf

[7] UN Women, "The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women," 2020, p25.

[8] Zawati, H. (2014). 'The Challenge of Prosecuting Conflict-related Gender-based Crimes under Libyan Transitional Justice'. Journal of International Law and International Relations. Winter 2014, Vol. 10: 44-91. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2548049

[9] UNW and UNFPA, Roundtable discussion, August 2020.

[10] Langhi, Z. (2014). "Gender and Peace-building in Libya: towards a politics of inclusion". The Journal of North African Studies. Vol. 19, No. 2: 200-210 .

[11] UN Women, "The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women," 2020, p83. The survey found that women were twice as likely to rely on their family and family networks to resolve violent crimes (60 percent of women compared with 32 percent of men).

[12] UNW and UNFPA, Roundtable discussion, August 2020.

[13] UN Women, "The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women," 2020, p53.

[14] UNW and UNFPA, Roundtable discussion.

[15] Idris, Iffat. "Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in Libya." K4D, 2017.

[16] UNDP, "Rapid Diagnostic on the Situation of Local Governance and Local Development in Libya," November 2015.

[17] Center for Insights in Survey Research, "Libyan Municipal Council Research," 2016. https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_libya_municipal_councils_presentation.pdf

[18] Amnesty International, "Libya: Women human rights defenders still under attack, four years after activist's assassination, " June 2018.

[19] Tim Lister & Nada Bashir, "She's one of the most prominent female politicians in her country. A few days ago she was abducted from her house." CNN News. https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/20/africa/libya-sergewa-intl/index.html

[20] UNW and UNFPA, Roundtable discussion, August 2020.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Council on Foreign Relations, "What Research Shows." https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/research

[23] Idris, Iffat. "Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in Libya." K4D, 2017.

[24] UNW and UNFPA, Roundtable discussion.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Labor Code Act No. 58 (1970), Wade Scales for National Workers Act No. 15 (1981)

[27] UNW and UNFPA, Roundtable discussion, August 2020.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] UN Women, "The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women," 2020, p31.

[32] The World Bank, Gender Data Portal, 2020, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/country/libya

[33] UN Women, "The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women," 2020, p36.

[34] UNW and UNFPA, Roundtable discussion.

[35] UN Women, "The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women," 2020, p35.

[36] UNW and UNFPA, Roundtable discussion, August 2020.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ANNEX A: METHODOLOGY

This policy brief is based on a series of roundtable discussions held by UN Women and UNFPA in August 2020. These discussions, entitled, "Deepening Stabilization in Libya: The Role of Young Women in Peace Building," invited over a dozen young Libyan women to share their experiences and perspectives on three primary topics: peace and political processes, countering violent extremism, and livelihood opportunities. Participants joined the conversation remotely from all over Libya, and included political activists, civil society leaders, and entrepreneurs. Over three days, they discussed the obstacles facing young Libyan women who want to be more involved in peace building, and shared their demands for local, national, and international actors to overcome these challenges. The challenges and recommendations outlined in this paper are drawn directly from these conversations, although they have been supplemented by additional research and evidence as appropriate.

ANNEX B: GBV AND ARTICLE 424

GBV will continue to be perpetrated with impunity if gender discriminative laws such as those contained in Article 424 of the penal code continue to be applied in Libya. This article exonerates perpetrators of rape in the event that they decide to marry the victim. It is obvious that this article goes against the wishes and rights of the survivors, and since it is widely known and applied, it poses a huge barrier to access of services. As a result, it only serves to put many would-be survivors at risk of the life-threatening consequences associated with rape.

ANNEX C: INTERLINKED LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES AND VIOLENCE

One point of optimism in Libya is that women are well represented on college campuses, graduating at nearly the same rate as men, according to a 2020 UN Women study. However, this has not led to income equality or high-paying jobs for women in the private sector. Libyan women with high school educations earn an average of 548 LYD per month, while those with a university degree earn 795 LYD, a 45% increase. On the other hand, Libyan men with high school educations earn 1358 LYD per month, on average, compared to 2271 LYD with a degree, a jump of 67%. Because of the different economic opportunities available to women and men in the private sector, Libyan women report a much smaller financial return on higher education than Libyan men do. The gap is especially notable in the oil sector, where women are virtually absent.

Women's exclusion from the private labor market leaves them vulnerable to financial pressure, domestic violence, and even radicalization. Research on Islamic State recruits from Muslim-majority countries suggests that some women see joining extremist groups as offering freedom from restrictive traditions and cultural norms (see, for instance, Rafia Zakaria's paper "Women and Islamic Militancy," Dissent 2015). Other studies find that radicalization can be a response to a lack of opportunities (see ICG's article "Syria Calling," January 2015).

ANNEX D: INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS FOR GENDER, AGE, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

In recent decades, increasing attention has been paid to the importance of gender- and age-related dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding, often led by international bodies. One seminal document is UNSCR 1325, approved in 2000, which calls for equal participation of women in peace processes, protection of women from violence (especially GBV), and the mainstreaming of gender in the conflict management field. More recently, UNSCR 2467, passed in 2019, emphasizes the need for a survivor-centered approach to addressing conflict-related sexual violence, and recognizes the need for specialized support and assistance for those affected. This year, UNSCR 2535 was adopted, calling on member states to include young people in preventing and resolving conflict. To date, implementation of these paradigms has been inadequate in Libya, as women and youth (and young women especially) remain marginalized in official peace processes and lack dedicated services to address their unique challenges. *Sources*: UNSCR 1325 (2000); UNSCR 2467 (2019); UNSCR 2535 (2020).

ANNEX E: MAINSTREAMING GENDER: THE EXAMPLE OF LIBYA RED CRESCENT

The Libya Red Crescent Society (LRC), a member of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, was without a gender coordinator from the 1980s until 2018, when the position was reinstated. At first, all local offices opposed the idea, but as of 2020, 26 out of 36 offices have filled the position with a woman. As a result, LRC has seen increased participation of women in field activities, training sessions, and other capacity-building programs. There is increased discussion within the LRC of women's issues and the role of women in the organization. Additionally, women in broader Libyan society see the example of female leaders in the LRC, and are encouraged to volunteer with the organization and take leadership roles in other groups. Unfortunately, there has been a predictable social backlash against the increased visibility of women from some in Libyan society, who call for the closure of gender coordinator positions. Still, the example of the LRC shows how national organizations can elevate and inspire women as leaders and participants through gender-sensitive recruitment. *Source*: Interview with LRC official (name withheld out of privacy concerns), August 2020.